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I, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In their petition for rehearing, respondents, V. Ross Ekins 
and S. 0. Ekins (collectively, the "Ekins") advance a final series 
of arguments intended to relieve them from their obligation to 
repay appellant, Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated ("Heller") 
the numerous loans which it made to U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. 
("Rock Wool") — a corporation in which the Ekins had a 99.6% 
interest. As demonstrated below, each of those arguments is 
without merit and has already been argued, addressed and rejected 
by this Court. 
In order to justify rehearing, the Ekins must demonstrate that 
this Court has overlooked or misapprehended some point of law or 
controlling fact. Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals permits rehearings in limited circumstances and was not 
intended to serve as a crutch for counsel seeking a second 
opportunity to present their arguments; the rule does not permit 
reargument of the same matters already adjudicated absent 
demonstrable mistake. See United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 762 
(1st Cir. 1972) , vacated on other around sub nom. Gravie v. United 
States. 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (interpreting the federal counterpart 
of Rule 35) . Cf. Harlin Construction Co. v. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co. . 25 Utah 2d 271, 480 P.2d 464 (1971). Without a showing 
that the court has overlooked or misapprehended controlling facts 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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or authority, rehearing a fully litigated and decided case would 
operate directly contrary to the "fundamental rule of repose" and 
the public policy that "there must be some end to litigation . . 
. ." IB J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 
10.405, at 186-87 (1988 ed.) In their petition for rehearing, the 
Ekins have failed to present any authority from California or any 
other jurisdiction which indicates that this Court "overlooked or 
misapprehended" any facts or points of law such as to merit the 
rehearing of this Court's well-reasoned opinion. Their petition 
for rehearing should be denied. 
II, ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Correctly Interpreted The 
Unconditional Guaranty As A Waiver 
Of The Ekins1 Objection To The Alleged 
»- Impairment Of The Collateral 
Regardless of how they phrase it, the main thrust of the 
Ekins1 argument in Points I and II (Heller's supposed breaches of 
the contracts with Rock Wool and the Ekins) , as well as Points III 
(an unconditional guaranty is not really "unconditional") and IV 
(failure to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable 
manner) of their Petition is the same: Heller acted unreasonably 
in its treatment and disposition of the collateral for the Rock 
Wool loan and thereby impaired the value of the collateral. The 
Ekins argue that as a result of this conduct, Heller discharged the 
2 
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guarantors from any liability for payment of Rock Wool's debt to 
Heller. These are the very same arguments which both parties 
addressed exhaustively in their principal briefs1 and which this 
Court fully addressed in its thoughtful opinion. The Ekins provide 
no relevant facts or legal authority which were overlooked or 
misapprehended to warrant reconsideration of this argument. 
In a transparent attempt to present an old argument as a new 
issue, the Ekins devote significant attention in their Petition to 
the claim that a guarantor has not waived its right to assert the 
defense of impairment of collateral by the fact that its guaranty 
is absolute and unconditional. Yet this argument flies in the face 
of the plain language of the guaranty herein which was not only 
absolute and unconditional, but also contained an unequivocal 
waiver of rights in the collateral: 
The undersigned . . . waive notice of any 
consents [sic] to the granting of indulgence 
or extension of time payment, the taking and 
releasing of security in respect of any said 
receivable, agreements, obligations, 
indebtedness or liabilities so guaranteed 
hereunder, or our accepting partial payments 
thereon or your settling, compromising or 
compounding any of the same in such manner and 
at such times as you may deem advisable, 
1
 In support of its position, and this Court's decision that 
the Ekins did unequivocally waive the defense of impairment of 
collateral, Heller incorporates by reference the points and 
authorities set forth in pages 20-28 of its principal brief. 
3 
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without in anyway impairing or affecting our 
liability for the full amount thereof . . . 
Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., Inc. 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9-10 
(1988). 
As the Court correctly noted in its decision enforcing the 
guaranty, California appellate courts have consistently enforced 
similar waivers. Id. (quoting American Security Bank v. Clarno, 
151 Cal. App. 3d 874, 199 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984)). In fact, no case 
has been found from any jurisdiction in which language comparable 
to that in the Heller guaranty did not operate to waive a 
guarantor's defense of impaired collateral.2 More significantly, 
however, the Ekins have found no authority in which a court has 
Because this Court has already ruled correctly that the 
Ekins waived the defense of impaired collateral, Heller declines 
to engage in reargument as to this issue and rather supplements 
that authority already supplied as follows: See Simpson v. M Bank 
Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102 (Texas 1987) (defense of impairment 
may be waived) ; First Security, Bank of Idaho, H.A. v. Mountain 
View Equipment Co. , Inc. , 739 P.2d 1078 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) aff'd 
on different grounds 739 P. 2d 39 (1987) (waiver will be given 
effect); H & H Operations, Inc. v. West Georgia National Bank of 
Carrollton, 181 Ga. App. 766, 353 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); 
United States v. Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 1984) 
("Where a guarantee is unconditional, a creditor, at least absent 
willful or grossly negligent waste or misconduct may recover a 
deficiency judgment from an unconditional guarantor without regard 
to the creditors treatment of the collateral.11) ; Kansas State Bank 
& Trust Co., v. Delorean, 7 Kan. App.2d 246, 640 P.2d 343 (1982) 
(absolute nature of guarantee does not waive rights to unimpaired 
collateral, but consent similar to that in the Heller guaranty does 
waive rights). 
4 
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refused to enforce such a waiver. Indeed, the principal case on 
which the Ekins rely actually supports Heller's position. See 
e.g., Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, 
Inc. , 742 P.2d 105, 107-109 (Utah App. 1987) ("an absolute guarantor 
may explicitly waive his rights against collateral") cited at 
Respondents' Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 6. 
Further, this Court correctly recognized that to excuse the 
Ekins from liability on the theory that Heller impaired the value 
of the collateral by not disposing of it in a commercially 
reasonable manner is to impose upon the contract an interpretation 
contrary to the stated intent of the parties. The express language 
of the guaranty contract gives Heller the unfettered right to 
release the collateral. By giving Heller this right, the Ekins 
foreclosed themselves from objecting that the collateral was 
disposed of unreasonably. United States v. Bertie, 529 F.2d 506, 
507 (9th Cir. 1976)(court denied defense of commercial 
reasonableness to a guarantor where "[t]he terms of the agreement 
imposed no duty on the [creditor] with reference to the collateral. 
Indeed, the agreement permitted the [creditor] to release the 
collateral entirely without consent of the guarantors."); Western 
Bank v. Aqua Leisure, Ltd., 737 P.2d 537 (N.M. 1987) (New Mexico 
Supreme Court held that the defense of commercial reasonableness 
was not available to a guarantor who had agreed that the creditor 
5 
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could "sell . . . at such price and upon such terms as it may deem 
reasonable any collateral now or hereafter held by it . . . without 
in any manner affecting the liability of the [guarantor].11). See 
also Morris v. Columbia National Bank of Chicago, 79 B.R. 777 (N.D. 
111. 1987)(commercial reasonableness waived). 
In sum, this Court, like California courts that have 
interpreted similar language, merely held the guarantors to the 
agreement that the guarantors made. The guaranty was absolute and 
unconditional and gave the creditor complete freedom in the 
disposition of the collateral. By executing this guaranty, the 
Ekins waived any rights that they may have had under § 2 819 of the 
California Civil Code. Clarno, supra. 
B. Heller's Supposed Breaches Of Its 
Obligations To Rock Wool Did Not Relieve 
The Ekins From Their Unconditional Guaranty. 
In Points One and Two of their argument the Ekins rely upon 
the trial court's Findings of Fact 9 and 10 to support their 
contention that because the trial court found Heller to have 
breached its contract with Rock Wool and the Ekins, the Ekins are 
released from their guaranty. This argument was fully addressed 
and rejected by this Court in its opinion where it stated as 
follows: 
However, the challenged findings pertain only 
to the loan agreement between Rock Wool and 
Heller. Heller's obligations thereunder are 
not conditions to the Ekinses1 liability under 
6 
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their unconditional guaranty. We conclude that 
findings as to bad faith under the loan 
agreement are not pertinent to the question of 
liability on the personal guaranty. 
Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9 (1988). This 
Court's disposition of the Ekins1 argument was correct for three 
reasons, each of which is independently dispositive of the issue: 
in the Guaranty, the Ekins waived the right to assert any arguable 
defense Rock Wool might have to liability; the trial court's 
Findings of Fact do not support the legal conclusion that Heller 
materially breached its contract with either Rock Wool or the 
Ekins; and, the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Rock Wool's liability under the loan agreement. 
In the Guaranty, the Ekins waived any rights they might 
arguably have had to assert any of Rock Wool's defenses to 
liability by agreeing to be primarily, absolutely and 
unconditionally liable and by further agreeing to remain fully 
liable for Rock Wool's indebtedness even if Heller compromised or 
settled Rock Wool's "obligations, indebtedness or liabilities . . 
." Thus, as this Court has already held, the Ekins1 argument which 
relies upon the unsupportable allegations that Heller breached its 
contract with Rock Wool fails on its face.3 
3
 Heller buttresses this Court's conclusion that the Findings 
of Fact regarding the Rock Wool contract are irrelevant with the 
following authority: Victory Highway Village, Inc. v. Weaver, 480 
F. Supp. 71 (D. Minn. 1979) ; (guarantor remains liable regardless 
7 
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Moreover, even if Heller had not agreed to waive Rock Wool's 
defenses to liability, the Ekins can take no comfort in the 
longstanding principle that a party to a contract may be discharged 
by the other party's material breach of the agreement. Here the 
trial court made no specific finding that any of the supposed 
"breaches" committed by Heller was material. Indeed, it could 
hardly do so since under California law, a "material breach is one 
that is so dominant and pervasive as in any real or substantial 
measure to frustrate the purpose of the undertaking." Fantasy, 
Inc. v. Foaerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The 
purpose of the undertaking in this case was the loan of money to 
Rock Wool. Heller clearly fulfilled the purpose of the undertaking 
by lending Rock Wool over $70,000. For this reason, none of the 
supposed "breaches of contract" identified by the trial court in 
of whether the obligation - of the principal debtor has been 
released, discharged or altered in any manner where guaranty 
clearly provides for the unconditional liability of the 
guarantors); First Security Bank of Idaho, supra (although release 
of a principal debts usually discharges a guarantor, the 
unequivocal language of the guaranty agreement at issue 
effectively waived the defense of release); See also McGill v. 
Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 494, 632 P.2d 683 (1981); United 
States v. Beardslee, 562 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1977); Restatement of 
Security (1944) § 122 at 322. 
8 
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Findings of Fact 9(a)/ 9(b),5 9(c) and 106 was sufficiently 
material to relieve Rock Wool and the Ekins of the obligation to 
repay the loan. 
Finally, the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue 
Findings of Fact 9 which purported to adjudicate Rock Wool's 
liability to Heller. When Rock Wool filed its petition in 
bankruptcy, the petition operated as a stay of all proceedings 
involving in any way the bankrupt's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 3 62. Acts 
^Finding of Fact 9(a) is essentially a finding that Heller 
refused to extend Rock Wool additional credit. Even if Heller's 
conduct were a breach (which it was not) , Rock Wool and Ekins would 
not be relieved from their contractual obligations to repay any 
amounts previously loaned and outstanding. See, e.g., Crider v. 
First National Bank of Louisville, 144 Ga. App. 536, 241 S.E.2d 
638, 642 (1978) ("the general rule [is] that failure to fund money 
or lend to a principal additional sums does not operate to 
discharge guarantors from liability for the amount which was 
actually advanced by the lender."). 
5The trial court's finding in 9(b) does not support a finding 
of a breach, much less a material breach. Finding of Fact 9(b) 
concerns Heller's supposed negligence in notifying Rock Wool's 
customers that payments were to be made to Heller. Since there 
was nothing in the lending agreement that dealt with the manner of 
notifying Rock Wool's customers, there is no basis for the claim 
that this conduct breached the lending agreement. 
6Findings of Fact 9(c) and 10 describe nothing more than 
Heller's lawful exercise of its right to enforce its contractual 
rights by foreclosing on its trust deed and seeking judgment on the 
Ekins' personal guaranty. There is no provision in either the 
subordination agreement with Valley Bank (to which the Ekins were 
not even party) or the guaranty agreement which inhibits Heller 
from fully enforcing their contractual rights in the manner 
described in these findings. 
9 
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performed in violation of the automatic stay are void from their 
inception. In the Matter of Clark, 60 B.R. 13, 14 (Bkrtcy N.D. 
Ohio 1986) ("It is well established that acts taken in violation 
of the automatic stay are void ab initio, regardless of whether or 
not the parties so acting had notice of the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.") Accord, Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips 
Foods Corp. , 536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976). Moreover, the 
commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of 
11
. . . all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
Obviously, such property includes the debtorfs interest in 
contracts with third parties. 
Because of the automatic stay imposed by Rock Wool's 
bankruptcy filing and of the estate created by that filing, it was 
necessary to obtain from the Bankruptcy Court an order granting 
limited relief from the stay in order to permit Heller to proceed 
against the Ekins on their guaranty. (See App. i) . Accordingly, 
the Bankruptcy Court issued an order which stated: 
The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 
shall be, and the same hereby is, lifted for 
f the limited purpose of permitting Walter E. 
Heller Western, Inc. to seek to establish in 
certain pending state court proceedings the 
extent of [Rock Woolfs[ liability to Heller 
under a certain accounts financing security 
agreement dated December 27, 1979, and thereby 
enable Heller to seek a determination 
respecting the liability of the debtor's 
10 
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accommodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. 
Ekins, under a certain Guaranty Agreement dated 
December 27, 1979. (Emphasis added.) 
Under the relief order, the only issue the trial court had 
jurisdiction to determine with respect to Rock Wool was the amount 
it owed to Heller under the loan agreement. The relief order did 
not extend to permit state court excursions into issues of the 
nature and legal sufficiency of Heller's performance of obligations 
owed to Rock Wool under the loan agreement. To the extent that the 
trial court in Findings of fact 9 purported to identify Heller's 
breaches of its contract with Rock Wool, the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction since it clearly violated the scope of the stay order. 
For the same reason, the Ekins1 reliance upon these Findings of 
Fact to support their claim that Heller's breach of its contracts 
with Rock Wool reduces or eliminates their liability under the 
Guaranty must fail — only the bankruptcy court is empowered to 
determine the precise nature and extent of Heller's alleged breach 
of its contracts with Rock Wool and the extent to which any such 
breaches caused damages to Rock Wool. 
C. The Court Properly Rejected the 
Ekins' Bad Faith Argument. 
The Ekins' arguments regarding bad faith are meritless. This 
issue has already been addressed by the Court: 
Heller next argues that the trial court erred 
in finding Heller breached its obligations to 
act in good faith and in a commercially 
11 
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reasonable manner. . . However, the challenged 
findings pertain only to the loan agreement 
between Rock Wool and Heller. . . We conclude 
that findings as to bad faith under the loan 
agreement are not pertinent to the question of 
liability on the personal guaranty. 
See 93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. Because this Court has already 
considered and rejected the Ekins1 contentions regarding good 
faith, this issue must not now be reconsidered absent some 
indication, which the Ekins have failed to provide, that in 
reaching its decision this Court overlooked or misapprehended some 
controlling fact or law. 
Finally, even accepting as true, all of the trial court's 
findings of fact, these findings fail to support a conclusion that 
Heller acted in bad faith under California law, or for that matter, 
under any jurisdiction's definition of bad faith of which we are 
aware. In Clarno, the court in rejecting the guarantor's 
contention that the duty of good faith was violated when the 
creditor failed to perfect a security interest, explained that the 
duty of good faith only requires "a creditor to disclose pertinent 
facts which would materially increase the risk the surety intended 
to assume." 199 Cal. Rptr. at 13 3. Here the Ekins cannot 
plausibly complain of nondisclosure of facts about the debtor, Rock 
Wool, that would have materially increased their risk since the 
12 
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Ekins, as principals of Rock Wool, presumably had the greatest 
knowledge of Rock Wool's financial condition. 
Dt The Court Correctly Remanded this 
Case to the Trial Court for Entry of 
Judgment in Favor of Heller. 
The Ekins contend in their Petition that this Court erred in 
remanding this case with directions for the trial court to enter 
judgment for Heller in the amount of Rock Wool's indebtedness, 
citing Finding of Fact 13 for the proposition that the trial court 
already had found that Heller had failed to prove any damages. The 
trial court's Finding of Fact 13, regarding damages, embodied all 
of the erroneous conclusions of law challenged on appeal and, 
although denominated a Finding of Fact, is itself, a conclusion of 
law. This Court has already properly overturned this conclusion 
on the ground that because of the absolute and unconditional nature 
of the Guaranty, the Ekins are liable for the repayment of the 
money advanced to Rock Wool notwithstanding any arguable defense 
Rock Wool might have to its liability for repayment. 
Furthermore, the record in this case is replete with evidence 
establishing the amount of the Ekins1 liability to Heller under the 
Guaranty. First, on May 3, 1984, Heller filed a proof of claim 
with the bankruptcy court to assert and preserve its secured claim 
against Rock Wool in the amount of $71,780.48, plus accrued and 
accruing post-petition interest, late charges, services charges and 
13 
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attorneys1 fees. (See, Trial Exhibit "Z" attached hereto as App. 
ii) . The Ekins, as controlling shareholders of Rock Wool, adduced 
no evidence establishing that Rock Wool ever objected to Heller's 
proof of claim. That failure resulted in conclusive allowance of 
the proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) which provides: 
"A claim or interest, proof of which is filed 
under § 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, 
unless a party in interest, including a 
creditor of a partner in the partnership that 
is a debtor in a case under Chapter 7 of this 
title, obj ects." 
At trial, Heller's real estate loan supervisor, Dennis Nye, the 
custodian of Heller's books and records of account relating to the 
Rock Wool loan, testified that, after taking into account post-
petition interest (accruing at the rate of $37.45 per day) and 
attorney's fees, the amount due and owing as of November 25, 1985 
was $86,081.06. (See, R. 1423-1480; Trial Exhibit »CC" attached 
hereto as App. iii). 
Finally, the Ekins argue that this Court's instructions for 
remand should have included directions for the reinstatement of 
their counterclaim. The Ekins1 argument borders on the frivolous. 
All of the grounds supposedly supporting the Ekins1 defenses to 
their liability on the guaranty are the same grounds upon which the 
trial court relied in rendering judgment in favor of Ekins on their 
counterclaim. Accordingly, the reversal of the trial court's 
14 
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judgment against Heller on Heller's complaint, necessarily 
precludes reinstatement of any judgment against Heller on the 
Ekins' counterclaim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court should deny the Ekins1 
Petition for Rehearing and decline to modify or supplement its 
well-reasoned decision dated October 14, 1988. Heller respectfully 
requests that in the unlikely event that this Court should grant 
the Ekins1 Petition for Rehearing, that the Court order reargument 
pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 1989. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
f4*t JU /^ir-^c/ 
IN T. ANDERSON 
''Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / J day of January, 1989, 
I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing appellantfs 
response to respondents1 petition for rehearing to be hand 
delivered to the following counsel of record: 
Earl D. Tanner, Esq. 
36 South State Street, #1020 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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App. i 
Cary D. Jones, Esq. 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <5c LETA 
Attorneys for Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated 
Suite 1200, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7520 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
ooOoo 
IN RE: 
U. S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC. 
Debtor. 
ooOoo-
Bankruptcy No. 83-A-03213 
STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER RESPECTING 
LIMITED RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 
Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated ("Heller"), a secured creditor of the 
above named debtor, through its counsel, John T. Anderson, Hansen Jones 
Maycock <5c Leta, and the debtor, through its counsel, Anna W. Drake, Nielsen ic 
Senior, hereby stipulate and agree, and Hellerfs counsel moves, that Heller be 
granted relief from the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 to the extent 
necessary to permit Heller to seek an adjudication from the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, respecting the precise extent of 
debtor's liability to Heller under a certain Accounts Financing Security Agreement 
dated December 27, 1979. That issue is presently being litigated in proceedings 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
captioned, Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. S. Rock Wool Company, 
Inc., et aL, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil 
No. C-83-2368. Resolution of that issue is required to fix the liability of the 
debtor's accomodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins, under a certain 
Guaranty Agreement dated December 27, 1979. 
DATED this 3**- day of Dfeccmbcr, 1D83. 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <5c LETA 
By ^^\^K*^jC\~*AJL'sdx^' 
Cary CK Jones 
John T. Anderson 
Attorneys for Walter E. Heller 
Western Incorporated 
NIELSEN <5c SENIOR 
By fa^KAJUO-AsaJu^ 
Anna W. Drake 
Attorneys for Debtor 
O R D E R 
Based on the foregoing stipulation and good cause appearing therefor, it is 
hereby-
ORDERED that the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 shall be, 
and the same hereby is, lifted for the limited purpose of permitting Walter E. 
Heller Western Incorporated to seek to establish in certain pending state court 
proceedings the extent of debtor's liability to Heller under a certain Accounts 
Financing Security Agreement dated December 27, 1979, and thereby enable 
Heller to seek a determination respecting the liability of the debtor's 
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V 
accomodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. O. Ekins, under a certain Guaranty 
Agreement dated December 27, 1979. 
DATED this day of Dle£S&er, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
il 
The/Honorable John H. Allen 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ,'Z. "^ day of December, 1983, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent, postage prepaid in the United 
States mail to the following: 
Anna W. Drake, Esq. 
NIELSEN 6c SENIOR 
Suite 1100, Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
x l / ^ / //%:<£^A, 
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IN THt UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH P - ^ - l 
.n r e { 
I Bankruptcy Case No. 83-A-3213 
0. S. BOCK WOOL COMPANY, INC. ) 
Debtor(x). ) PROOF OF CLAIM 
Mease print or type. Attach additional pages if needed. 
1. Claimant's name and address: Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated 
333 Market Street, Suite 240 
San Francisco, California 94105 
2. The debtor was on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, and still is, 
indebted to this claimant in the sum of S 7i.7ao.ia oiua* which includes: 
S 71.780.48 principal (if applicable) 
$ earned Interest (if applicable) 
$ other (explain) 
3. The debtor owes this money because: Periodic lean advances nade pursuant 
to an Accounts Financing Security Agreement dated 12/27/79, an Inventory 
Loan Security Agreement dated 12727779 and a Qw+flsl **^r^aam Security Agreement-
4. A copy of any writing upon which this claim is based is attached. dated W21/1?. 
5. The only security interest (collateral) held for this claim is: Collateral 
described in the written Security Agreement identified in 11 3 and 4 above. True 
a n d m m v » m p - i o c nf f i n a n r i nrr et -at- f lnmH-a f i 1 a ^ - in H i a O f - P i ^ a nf J-ha Hf-ah S&Z~ 
retary of State for the purpose.,. .
 w _ 4 ^__ A4 __M% nf p»rfPcH™j «-hig »** . Tattach writing, i f any) 
Unsecured % 
6. The claim is x Secured* $ 71,780.48, plus post-petition interest, late 
n J -^  ** # charges, service charges and 
: Priority** $ attorneys' fees. 
$ 71 .780 ,49 fflua* TOTAL AMOUNT CLAIMED 
*The claim is unsecured except to the extent that the security interest 
has value sufficient to satisfy it . 
**If priority is claimed, state basis under bankruptcy law:___ 
DATED: /n^UHr Signature: V \ \ r K ^ ^ Ja~a^
 : 
T i t l e : At torney for Wal ter E. W^l lar Wagfarn T n m r ^ n r . i r ^ 
(if not signed by claimant personally) 
Claim Number 
(for office use only) WARNING: Presenting a fraudulent claim 1n a bank-
ruptcy case is a federal crime, bearing a penalty 
of a $5,000 maximum fine and imprisonment of up 
to five years. 18 U.S.C. 1152 
* post-petition interest, late charges, service fees and attorneys' fees. 
*** claimant's security interest in the described collateral are attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference £^^^Mm^m^^^^^im^mf^z 
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